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THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION AND PARANOIA: THE KNOW NOTHING
PARTY AS A CASE STUDY IN FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION ANALYSIS
Elton W. Weintz, M. A.
Western Michigan University, 2003
Historically, American democracy has been based on a
policy of exclusion where the empowered have enjoyed the
luxury of deciding which groups would be eligible to
participate fully in the great American experiment--a
flawed system based upon discriminatory notions of class,
racism, sexism, and nativism.

Richard Hofstadter's

paranoia interpretation--that irrational beliefs in
conspiracies led to civic participation in exclusionary
movements--provides some rationale for this exclusionary
behavior.
Taking a multidisciplinary approach, this paper
applies the social psychological theory of frustration
aggression analysis in conjunction with Hofstadter's
paranoia interpretation in an attempt to further
understand exclusionary behavior in American history.

In

particular, this work analyzes the nativist movement of
the antebellum period as well as how the political
culture of paranoia sustained the movement's chief
protagonist--the Know Nothing party.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One of the tragic truths of American democracy is
the inherent hypocrisy prevalent in the fundamental idea
that "all men are created equal."

From the time that

those words were initially penned and agreed upon by the
Founding Fathers, it was painfully clear that this
equality was only meant for the privileged few--the most
notable exceptions being women, slaves, and other non
whites.

Not even all white males shared in this

democratic notion since only property-owning individuals
really had access to the ballot and elected office.
Historically, American democracy has been based on a
policy of exclusion where those few empowered individuals
have enjoyed the luxury of deciding which groups would be
eligible to participate fully in the great American
experiment--a flawed system based upon discriminatory
notions of class, racism, sexism, and nativism.
Focus of the Study
For decades, historians and social scientists have
attempted to provide some rationale for exclusionary
1

2

behavior in American political culture.

With an increase

in interdisciplinary studies in the understanding of
ethnic, race, and gender relations, new approaches to
scientific research and historical interpretation can be
created through the incorporation of complementary
methods.

In some cases, quantitative methods can be used

to strengthen qualitative or interpretive approaches
utilized in the humanities supporting certain
propositions or suppositions over others. 1

Additionally,

where substantial quantitative data may not exist,
scientific theories could still be applied in an
interpretive setting to explain why something occurred. 2
The subject of this research project is the Know
Nothing movement of the 1850s.

Historical research on

the subject of the Know Nothing movement is
extraordinarily disjointed.

Few monographs exist and,

for the most part, the movement has played a supplemental
role in the explanation of the rise of the Republican

1

Prime examples of this approach are W. E. B. DuBois's study of
urban problems in his 1899 work, The Philadelphia Negro, or St. Clair
Drake's and Horace Cayton's work on living conditions in Chicago
entitled, Black Metropolis (1945). In both cases, empirical research
is used to supplement interpretive values.
2 Karl Marx's, Georg Simmel's, and Erich Fromm's progressive studies
of alienation or Robert Merton's work in structural functionalism, in
particular, his study of anomie in Social Theory and Social Structure
(1968), are two examples of interpretative methods being used to
bolster studies where qualitative data is minimal.

Party during the 1850s.

3

3

Despite being relegated to a

secondary role, the movement offers unique insight to the
political culture of exclusion during the era as the Know
Nothings successfully combined anti-foreign and anti
Catholic sentiment to garner the support of a growing
number of Americans who had become disassociated and
dissatisfied with an unresponsive political climate.

The

movement's ability to foster this exclusionary sentiment
came as much from the public's uncertainty of their
economic and social futures and concern over the fate of
the Union in the face of the slavery question as it did
from a feeling of paranoia that permeated th� very fabric
of American culture at the time.
The qualitative assessment of exclusionary behavior
comes from Richard Hofstadter's paranoid interpretation
of American political culture, introduced in his 1965
work, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other

Essays.

In this study, Hofstadter asserted that waves of

paranoia resulted from times of economic crisis to
produce exclusion in American politics.

During the

1850s, with the increase of immigration to the United
3
Because reasons varied regionally concerning the public's
acceptance of the movement, few works dealing with the Know Nothings
on the national level exist. Therefore, for the most part, research
on the Know Nothing movement has been relegated to state and regional
studies.

States, this paranoia resulted from uncertain economic
and industrial prospects producing a climate of hostility
toward foreigners, most of whom were Catholics, and from
this hostility, attempts to limit their participation in
American politics.
The quantitative methods established in the social
psychological theory of frustration-aggression analysis
will be used in conjunction with Hofstadter's historical
interpretation in an attempt to further understand
exclusionary behavior in American history.

Using aspects

of conflict analysis and displaced aggression as
presented by Carl Hovland and Robert Sears (1940) and
Neal Miller (1948), this work will review how inhibited
acts of aggression can provide additional frustration and
aggression against objects perceived to be responsible
for this inhibition.

The decision to use frustration

aggression analysis as a methodological tool in this
interpretive study stems from the fact that this
particular analysis, although widely accepted by social
scientists, still has its detractors and cynics as to the
theory's effectiveness.

As such, by utilizing the

underlying principles of this theory in an interpretive
manner, this work also hopes to prove its effectiveness
in qualitative research settings.

4

5

Outline of the Study
This thesis is divided into five chapters.

Serving

as background, the second chapter of this work provides a
simple historical understanding of the Know Nothing
movement during the antebellum period.

Relying on both

primary and secondary sources, this chapter outlines the
political culture of the era.

Discussion focuses on

increases in immigration, the collapse of the two party
system, sectional concerns on the slavery question, and
the growing public concerns about a possible Catholic
menace.

The underlying theme of the chapter deals with

public appeal toward the anti-immigration and anti
Catholic movements as well as how grassroots nativist
organizations became a national political force in the
1850s.
The historiography of the Know Nothing movement is
described in Chapter Three.

This chapter examines

selected historical and political studies of the movement
in order to convey how scholars have interpreted the
political, social, and cultural events of the antebellum
period as well as the Know Nothing role in it.

In

particular, Hofstadter's paranoia interpretation is
introduced and explained.

Emphasis in this chapter is

placed on the paranoia interpretation and its influence
on recent historical and political studies.
Frustration-aggression analysis is the focus of the
fourth chapter.

The social psychological hypothesis of

frustration-aggression is detailed and examined as well
as the conflict theory developed by Hovland and Sears to
support that hypothesis.

Further scientific debate of

the hypothesis is provided by reviewing the research of
Alexander Mintz, Joseph Hepworth, and Stephen West.
Additionally, Neal Miller's and Don Fitz's work on
aggression displacement is analyzed to defend the Sears
and Hovland hypothesis and to expand the scientific
dialogue concerning interpersonal relations.
In the concluding chapter, the frustration
aggression model is used in conjunction with Hofstadter's
paranoia interpretation to better understand the
exclusionary political culture of the antebellum period.
The chapter revisits arguments for multidisciplinary
approaches in the interpretation of history and analyzes
their effectiveness.

Additionally, other historical

avenues and sociological methods are identified for
future interdisciplinary studies.

6

CHAPTER II
POLITICS OF EXCLUSION AND PARANOIA
As a nation, we began by declaring that "all men are
created equal." We now practically read it "all men
are created equal, except negroes." When the Know
Nothings get control, it will read "all men are
created equal, except negroes, and foreigners, and
catholics."
--Abraham Lincoln, 1855 1

History of the Know Nothing Movement
The early 1840s and 1850s can best be described as a
period of economic stagnation--money was scarce, people
were in debt, and banks had suspended specie payments.
Native workingmen felt anxious as they were continually
being brought into competition for jobs with a growing
immigrant class that would work for less pay.

Unable to

find refuge from their anxiety within a political system
perceived to have become more corrupt with the increased
participation of naturalized immigrants, native-born
whites began to turn to nativist organizations in an
effort to stem the influence of the immigrant class. 2
1

Abraham Lincoln, letter to Joshua F. Speed, August 24, 1855,
Richard N. Current, ed., The Political Thought of Abraham Lincoln,
(New York: Macmillan, 1967), 83.
2
Thomas J. Curran, Xenophobia and Immigration, 1820-1930, (Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1975), 32.

7

During the first two cehturies of the British
colonization effort and American independence (16071830), no more than one million people immigrated to the
thirteen colonies that would eventually become the United
States.

Most of these immigrants came from Great Britain

and the African continent.

Rarely, did the annual number

of immigrants entering America exceed 20,000. 3

In the

decade prior to 1845, just over seven hundred thousand
immigrants entered the United States.

In the following

ten years, nearly three million immigrants came to
America (See Table 1).

This substantial growth created a

strain on already limited economic and residential
resources in the urban areas of the northeast as well as
contributed to the rise in slums, poverty, moral
corruption, and crime in the cities.

A growing public

resentment by the predominantly Anglo-Saxon, Protestant
community toward these new immigrants was a natural
byproduct to the increase of the nation's social ills. 4
As a result, a political radicalism developed in order to
limit the effect of these immigrants in American culture
and society.

3

This nativism took the form of verbal and,

Vernon M. Briggs, Mass Immigration and the National Interest
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 54.
4
Dale T. Knobel, "America for the Americans: n The Nativist Movement
in the United States (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), 48.

8

9

eventually, physical assaults on the new immigrants.
Since the vast majority of immigrants entering the United
States in the 1840s and 1850s came from Ireland and
Germany (71.0% and 71.8%, respectively for each decade),
this resentment found further inspiration due to the
religious convictions of many of the newcomers-
Catholicism. 5
Table 1
Immigration to the United States 6
Year

Number

Year

1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844

45,372
76,242
79,340
38,914
68,069
84,066
80,289
104,565
52,496
78,615

1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854

Total

707,968

Number
114,371
154,416
234,968
226,527
297,024
369,980
379,466
371,603
368,645
427,833
2,944,833

Select Committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U. S.
Immigration Policy and the National Interest: Staff Report,
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1981), 230-231. Between 1841 and 1850, 1.7
million legal immigrants entered the United States. Of those
immigrants, 45.6% came from Ireland and 25.4% from Germany. In the
following decade, 36.6% arrived from Germany and 35.2% from Ireland.
Between 1830 and 1850, the Catholic Church in the United States grew
from approximately 600,000 practitioners to 3.5 million.
6
U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
5

Anti-Catholicism was not a new phenomenon in
antebellum America.

The strict hierarchical structure of

the Catholic religion along with the doctrine of
obedience to the Roman papacy were regarded as outmoded
European obscurantism and contrary to American democratic
ideals. 7

Native-born Americans argued that with the

Church's centralized nature and doctrine of unflagging
obedience to priests and bishops, the Catholic Church
wielded a disproportionate degree of influence over its
followers in local and state politics.

The Church's

ability to mold the immigrant population into an obedient
voting bloc, or political tool of the papacy, was
repugnant to the native populace who saw this not only as
an attack on the American ideals of liberty, free
thinking, and the franchise, but as a form of slavery as
well. 8

From this repugnancy, conspiracy ensued--the

belief that the Catholic Church wished to subjugate the
American people to the Roman papacy by gaining control of
the American political system through anti-democratic or
corrupt means.

As a result, when the American Catholic

Church continued to gain new adherents, in large part
1

The New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 245.
Knobel, 108-109. For further discussion concerning the notion of
"slave" in white, working class America during the antebellum period,
please see David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the
Making of the American Working Class (New York: Verso, 1991); and
Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the
American Working Class, 1778-1850 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1984)
8

10

from the influx of immigration from Ireland and Germany
in the 1840s, anti-Catholic propaganda could be found in
the nation's magazines, newspapers, and books and in the
violence perpetrated against Catholics in the nation's
streets. 9

Leading the charge were Protestant clergymen

and journalists who attacked Catholicism and its growing
influence in local political matters. 10
Fearful of Catholic influence in local politics and
emboldened by the papal conspiracy, native Protestants
sought to curtail the power of these newly-arrived
immigrants by proposing an extension to the time period
outlined in the nation's naturalization laws.

During the

antebellum era, immigrants could become naturalized
citizens and gain access to the ballot in five years.
With the vast wave of immigration in the late-1840s, the
early-1850s represented the first time that these new
citizens could exercise their right to vote.

Hoping to

take advantage of its growing political influence, the
9

Samuel Morse published Foreign Conspiracy Against the Liberties of
the United States (1835) calling for the curbing of Catholic
immigration and opposition to Catholic schools and officeholders. In
1836, a novel entitled, Awful Disclosure of the Hotel Dieu Nunnery of
Montreal, reported acts of debauchery, infanticide, murder, and rape
purportedly occurring at this particular nunnery. As a result of
anti-Catholic sermons, the Ursuline Convent in Charlestown,
Massachusetts, was burned to the ground in August 1834. In the
summer of 1844, violence broke out between Catholics and Protestants
in New York City and Philadelphia. The violence in Philadelphia
lasted four days leaving twenty people dead and almost one hundred
injured.
10
A Protestant Reformation Society was formed to disseminate anti
Catholic propaganda and newspapers such as Downfall of Babylon and
American Protestant Vindicator preached a crusade against the papacy.

11

Catholic Church sought to gain ecclesiastical ownership
of property, replace the King James Version of the Bible
with the Catholic Version for Catholic students attending
public schools, and divide school funds so that taxes
Catholics paid could be used to support parochial
schools. 11

The calls of a Catholic conspiracy soon gained

credence among the native-born population as Protestants
and anti-Catholic propagandists insisted that the
Catholic Church was attempting to establish an American
papacy through the acquisition of land, perpetuating the
influence and power of Catholic priests over devotees of
the faith, and, since education was perceived as an
essential element to class advancement, curtailing the
social mobility of many lower and middle-class Americans
by diverting funds from public schools to Catholic
schools. 12

As both major political parties sought to

garner support from these newly naturalized citizens (the
Democratic party, in particular), they attempted to curry
favor by adopting parts of the Catholic agenda. 13

Sensing

betrayal and a further corruption of the political
Curran, 32-43. For further discussion on Catholic influence in
American politics during the antebellum period, see William B.
Prendergast, The Catholic Voter in American Politics: The Passing of
the Democratic Monolith, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press, 1999), 33-68.
12
Michael F. Holt, "The Politics of Impatience: The Origins of Know
Nothingism," Journal of American History 60 (September 1973), 324;
Knobel, 120.
13
Ibid., 323. For example, in 1842, the New York legislature passed
the Maclay Act. This Act replaced the Protestant-run centralized
Public School Society with decentralized boards of education and
11

12

system, Protestants and anti-Catholics began to form
their own political agencies to combat the growing
Catholic threat.
Between 1843 and 1847, several nativist political
organizations arose from the perceived threat of
Catholics and immigrants to the established order.

Among

these were the religious-nationalistic American
Republicans.

Utilizing nativist stereotypes for

naturalized citizens, the American Republicans played
upon xenophobic fears in an attempt to win public
acceptance of their major political objectives--only
native Americans should hold public office, the King
James Version of the Bible should be retained in public
schools, and the naturalization process should be
extended from five years to twenty-one. 14

Although the

group's success was limited to local politics in New York
City, Philadelphia, and Boston, where political and
economic control was threatened by Catholics and
immigrants, and where American Republicans maintained an
unique alliance with state and local Whig party
politicians (who were losing the Catholic and immigrant
vote to the Democrats), it did establish itself as the
voice for thousands of discontented Americans and sought
allowed these boards to dispense funds as they saw fit. Although
funds could not be used for parochial schools, the Catholic Church
did gain control of educational resources in several districts in New
York City.
14 Curran, 36.

13

to expand its influence nationally when it became the
Native American party. 15

The party's national aspirations

were short-lived, however, as fearful Whigs sought to
dissolve the alliance with the American Republicans in
the face of waning national acceptance of nativist
propaganda due, in part, to the perceived scarcity of
labor as well as the encouragement of immigration by the
newer states in the midwest. 16

Even with the decline of

the nativist movement after 1847, its momentum was kept
alive by the formation of a number of secret fraternal
organizations whose goals were the protection of
"American" interests and principles and the symbolic
declaration--"America must be ruled by Americans." 17
Among these fraternal organizations was the Order of the
Star-Spangled Banner, which, eventually, would don its
more familiar nom de plume, the Know Nothings or the
American party.
Founded in 1849, by Charles Allen as a secret
patriotic society, the Order of the Star-Spangled Banner
soon gained national prominence through its ultra
nationalistic propaganda.

This New York-based

organization appealed to many Americans who feared the
evolving American culture and society brought on by
15

Ibid., 40-41.
Ibid. , 43.
17
David H. Bennett, The Party of Fear: From Nativist Movements to
the New Right in American History (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1988), 113, 123.
16

14

industrialization, urbanization, and immigration.
Fluctuations in the economy, unpredictable agricultural
production, and transportation and communication
advancements further disrupted the social and economic
security of the time by shifting employment practices and
population trends away from rural and small towns and
toward the urban centers developing in the northeast and
midwest. 18

Americans looked to the major political

parties for a sense of stability, but finding none,
turned to grassroots organizations in search of
direction.

Feeling the sense of public apprehension

toward the new social and cultural climate, the Order of
the Star-Spangled Banner slowly transformed itself into a
political entity and began to offer a viable alternative
on the local and state levels to the two-party system by
harnessing the public fear and leveling blame for the
present predicament squarely on the shoulders of
immigrants and Catholics, both of whom, it was believed,
sought to destroy the American way of life. 19
The ideology of the Know Nothing party appealed to
many Americans during the antebellum period.

The

movement advocated the belief that Protestantism defined
American society, that it encouraged individualism and
18

Carleton Beals, Brass-Knuckle Crusade, 1800-1860: A Study in the
Origins of American Nativism, (New York: Hastings House, 1960), 1112; Holt, 325-326; and Knobel, 42-44.
19
Knobel, 118-119.

15

16

democratic ideals, and that the autocratic nature of
Catholicism was not compatible with those ideals. 20

The

Know Nothings also contended that although few Catholics
lived in the United States, their political power was
disproportionate to their numbers due, in part, to their
unwavering fidelity to Church leaders and the willingness
of corrupt of political parties and professional
politicians to take advantage of this blind obedience for
their own personal and organizational gain. 21

Finally,

most northern Know Nothings espoused the need for legal
limitations on the extension of slavery and alcohol
consumption.

Although ambiguous on the former issue at

first, the eventual stand taken by the American party
after the 1854 elections would signal the end of its
influence in antebellum politics.
The rise of the American party on the national level
was abetted by the decline of the Whig party during the
early-1850s. 22

A split between the southern pro-slavery

and the northern anti-slavery factions over party support
of the Compromise of 1850 in the 1852 national elections
sounded the death peal for the Whigs.

Carrying only four

Tyler G. Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know
Nothings and the Politics of the 1850s, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992), 104.
21
Ibid., 105.
22
For extended information on the collapse of the Whig party, see
Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian
Politics and the Onset of the Civil War, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999); and Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the
American Whigs, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
20

17

states in the presidential election, the Whigs were on
the verge of collapse. 23

By the end of 1852, the southern

wing of the party ceased to exist--many of its members
joining the ranks of Union parties, which offered loyalty
to the United States and support for the Compromise.

In

the North, anti-slavery Whigs sought refuge in abolition
societies and conservative members of the party
eventually fell into the nativist ranks. 24

With the

Democratic passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854,
the second American party system soon collapsed as the
remaining factions of the Whig coalition abandoned the
organization and left third-party organizations such as
the Know Nothings and the Republicans to compete with the
Democrats in 1856. 25
Harnessing its nativist propaganda, the American
party sought to provide stability and union in a time of
sectional strife.

Echoing the need to advance "American"

values and interests, the party took aim against
immigrants in an effort to unite a disparate people.
Bolstered by the growing support and influence of former
Whig party members, the Know Nothings attacked the
Catholic and foreign-born appointments of the Democratic
Pierce administration. 26
23

24
25

26

Additionally, the American party

Bennett, 112.
Ibid.
Anbinder, 100-101.
Anbinder, 30-31; Bennett, 114; and Knobel, 107.

spoke out against the foreign vote arguing that
immigrants were corrupting the American political system
by voting in blocs that were easy prey for party
machines.

By 1854, the American party had established

itself in thirty-three states and had close to 1.3
million supporters. 27

During the November elections, the

American party carried the northern states of
Massachusetts, Delaware, and Pennsylvania and sent
seventy-five congressmen to Washington, among them was
Nathaniel P. Banks who would become Speaker of the House
of Representatives.

The following year, Connecticut, New

Hampshire, and Rhode Island joined the Know Nothing ranks
as well as the border states of Kentucky and Maryland.
The Know Nothing movement made substantial gains in
Tennessee, New York, and California and its popularity
began to make notable showings in southern states such as
Virginia, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. 28
With its apparent popularity and growing momentum, this
upstart movement appeared ready to fully replace the now
defunct Whig party in the country's two-party system and
send its nominee to the White House in 1856.
By 1856, the movement's nativist appeal began to
wane in the face of growing sectional strife brought on
27

Bennett, 116, 125.
Bennett, 124-125; and Ray Allen Billington, The Protestant
Crusade, 1800-1860: A Study of the Origins of American Nativism (New
York: Macmillan, 1938), 388-389.

28

18

by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, visions of "bleeding
Kansas," and its members own conflicting interests
concerning the slavery issue.

In 1856, the Know Nothing

candidate, former president Millard Fillmore, captured
only the state of Maryland, whose anti-Catholicism dated
back to its colonial times when it was established as a
religious refuge for Catholics.

In the end, it would be

the rise of another third party whose regional popularity
and anti-slavery stand eventually displaced the Know
Nothings on its way to becoming a major political entity
--the Republican party.
Summary
Although the Know Nothings and their national party
faded into obscurity after the elections of 1856, the
nativist underpinnings of the movement remained deeply
rooted in the fabric of American culture.

Nativist

movements and organizations sprang up to serve as
guardians of basic "American" values and culture during
the influx of immigration from eastern and southern
Europe in the 1880s and 1890s, and again throughout the
second and third decades of the twentieth century.
again, these organizations appealed to an American
populace fearful of an evolving American culture and
society brought on by unprecedented increases in

Once

19

industrialization, urbanization, and immigration.

And

once again, economic fluctuations, unpredictable
agricultural production, changes in employment trends and
practices as well as labor strife, racial segregation,
political corruption, the doctrines of social Darwinism
and laissez-faire, mechanization, and technological
advances led to an estrangement of the American people
from their culture and with it a renewed paranoia toward
those outsiders who the nativist propagandists declared
responsible for the country's plight.

Although the

Second World War, like the American Civil War, eventually
restrained nativist ideology, nothing could prepare the
American population for the paranoia movement of the
post-war years, a movement that would combine nativism,
nationalism, and anti-Communism to form the crux of
American politics and culture for nearly half a century-
McCarthyism.

20

CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL METHOD AND INTERPRETATION
Hofstadter's Paranoia Int�rpretation
For decades, historians and political scholars have
attempted to provide some rationale for exclusionary
behavior in American society. Richard Hofstadter's
paranoia interpretation espoused in his work, The
Paranoid Style in American Politics (1965), is one
explanation of this type of behavior.

In this work,

Hofstadter contended that irrational beliefs in
conspiracies to undermine American democracy and values
have led to civic participation in movements that were
anti-Masonic, nativist, anti-Catholic, and/or anti
communist in nature, namely the Know Nothings, the
American Protective Association, the Ku Klux Klan of the
1920s, and McCarthyism. 1

During the antebellum period,

one could even add an abolitionist belief in a
slaveholder conspiracy, and the populists, for their
part, believed that international bankers were taking
1

Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and
Other Essays, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 9, 14-40.
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over the world's economic markets during the last quarter
of the nineteenth century. 2
Hofstadter also observed that the strongest waves of
paranoia occurred during times of national duress--the
sectional strife of the antebellum period, the incredible
influx of immigration from 1845-1854, during the 1880s,
and once again from 1914-1920, the economic crises of the
Gilded Age, and the socialist and communist scares of the
1920s and 1950s. 3

Consequently, these bouts of paranoia

led directly to the exclusion of groups or the limitation
of rights for those who were perceived as the cause of
the social, economic, or political turmoil of the time or
were being used by the empowered to distract the American
public from the true source of their discontent.

This

"us versus them" mentality produced informal definitions
of American citizenry and helped to further divide the
country along racial, ethnic, religious, and gender
lines.

Perhaps one of the most successful groups in

2 In his work, The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style
(1969), David Brion Davis further defines the Hofstadter hypothesis
as "a psychological device for projecting various symbols of evil on
an opponent and for building emotional unity through common sense of
alarm and peril" (p. 4). Besides his discussion on the slave power
conspiracy, it is interesting to note that Davis' work also suggests
that many abolitionists believed the Know Nothing movement to be
nothing more than a southern conspiracy to divert attention from the
slavery issue (p. 14).
3
Hofstadter, 22-23.
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promoting this political culture of paranoia was the Know
Nothing party of antebellum America.
Historiography of the Know Nothing Movement
When scholars examine the political culture of the
antebellum period in American history, inevitably they
focus on sectional strife and the divisiveness of the
slavery issue.

Only recently, in the wake of the growing

reinterpretation of the collapse of the second party
system and the rise of the Republican party, has the Know
Nothing movement begun to receive proper scholarly
attention.

Historiography concerning this movement has

been limited to state or local studies and works on
nativism. 4

Additional research on the Know Nothings can

be found in their connection with the formation and rise
of the Republican party during the elections of 1856.
The works highlighted in this chapter show the changing
interpretations scholars have forwarded over the past
seventy years on the impact of the Know Nothing movement
in antebellum America.
Examples of these studies are: Jean H. Baker, Ambivalent Americans:
The Know Nothing Party in Maryland (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1977); John R. Mulkern, The Know Nothing Party in Massachusetts: The
Rise and Fall of a People's Movement (Boston: Northeastern University
Press, 1990); Larry Rand, "The Know Nothing Party in Rhode Island,"
Rhode Island History 23 (1964), 102-116; and Allan R. Whitmore, "'A
4
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Although Ray Allen Billington's work, The Protestant
Crusade (1938), offers limited historical interpretation,

its narrative account is important in order to understand
who the Know Nothings were and what values they
professed.

Based upon his doctoral thesis, this work is

the first scholarly account of the nativist movement that
developed during the first half of the nineteenth
century.

Using contemporary public and private papers,

publications and pamphlets of nativist organizations,
public records, and church accounts, Billington discusses
themes of anti-Catholicism, the war against immigration,
and the rise and fall of the Know Nothing movement in the
1850s.
According to Billington, the Know Nothing movement
and its appeal to hundreds of thousands of Americans was
a result of the confusion in party alignments, the
controversy over slavery, and the growing antagonisms
Americans felt toward foreigners and Catholics during the
first half of the nineteenth century. 5

The movement's

unifying belief, however, was directed more toward anti
Catholicism rather than anti-immigration because of the
movement's varied acceptance and focus in the country's
Guard of Faithful Sentinels': The Know Nothing Appeal in Maine, 18541855," Maine Historical Society Quarterly 20 (1981), 151-197.
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different geographical regions.

Billington enunciates

the perceived threat that the Catholic hierarchy posed
toward the established Protestant order and republican
values--the belief that the papacy exercised unlimited
control over its followers which deprived them of the
independent thought and action necessary to participate
in a republican government--and why, even after the
collapse of the Know Nothing movement, this sentiment
never waned during the nineteenth century. 6
The Know Nothing movement and its party organization
were prone to the same material matters that divided
other political organizations during this time of
sectional animosities.

For example, northern Know

Nothings opposed territorial expansion, believed that
labor should be protected from foreign competition
through a high protective tariff, worked toward a
homestead bill, and wanted government aid for internal
improvements. 7

Southern Know Nothings were adamantly

opposed to these ideas.

Therefore, other motivations,

such as hatred for the papacy, the preservation of the
Union, and nationalism, would be needed to unite
Northerners and Southerners to the Know Nothing cause.
Ray Allen Billington, The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860: A Study of
the Origins of American History (New York: Macmillan, 1938), 390.
6
Ibid., 9.

5
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Unfortunately, the sectional strife that existed
nationally between the North and South over issues such
as the Kansas-Nebraska Act, slavery, and states rights,
as well as the movement's inability to enact the
doctrines of its anti-Catholic and anti-foreign
propagandists would lead the Know Nothing movement to the
same fate as other political organizations of the era and
the movement's popular appeal would soon dissipate in the
face of differing sectional and regional interests that
would ultimately tear the country apart. 8
As argued in Billington's work, the Know Nothing
movement took on various forms in order to court voters
in different geographical regions.

As stated earlier,

Know Nothingism in the North was very different from that
in the South.

To further illustrate this point, W.

Darrell Overdyke's work, The Know-Nothing Party in the

South (1950), the only true monograph on Know Nothingism
in the South, contends that the Know Nothing party was
essentially a northern party since all of its political
victories occurred there.

Additionally, whereas the

northern faction of the party held strong anti-Catholic
beliefs, in the South, Catholics were allowed to
participate in the party and in most of the South,
7

Ibid., 386-387.
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nativism was not truly a concern since most immigration
at the time was coming into the northern industrial and
'
urban regions. 9

According to Overdyke, what appealed to

southerners was the party's stance, or lack thereof, on
the slavery question prior to 1855. 10
Because of its willingness to be ambiguous on many
of the nation's pressing issues, the Know Nothing
movement, by fostering a sense of national unity and
purpose, gained great prominence in the political arena
during the 1850s.

This singular focus on "Americanism"

or national pride is the basis of Carleton Beals' work,

Brass-Knuckle Crusade (1960).

Although narrative rather

than interpretive in its nature, Beals' work provides
additional insight for the movement's reliance on
nativist and anti-Catholic propaganda to secure vast
popular appeal.

This focus is reiterated through Beals'

use of secondary studies on these themes as well as the
attention given to nativist and anti-Catholic works and
writings of the time.
According to Beals, the Know Nothings played upon
the pathological fears and petty animosities held by the
8

Ibid., 423.
W. Darrell Overdyke, The Know Nothing Party in the South, (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1950), 218-219. Louisiana's
French Creoles, although Catholic, were able to participate in the
movement because of their separatist approach to the Roman papacy.
9
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general populace toward foreigners and Catholics and
initiated a grassroots campaign to curtail their
influence in American culture and society. 11
Additionally, the Know Nothings were aided by the
uprooting and uncertainty of the times-
industrialization, new class systems, labor
organizations, rapid population shifts, the disrepair of
urban centers--which contributed to the disintegration of
the old party system as well as political and moral
standards. 12

This confusion and uncertainty would lead to

some of the most violent confrontations in American
history between the native-born and the foreign-born
elements within American society.

This violence was a

mainstay of the era and the Know Nothings fed off it.
The Know Nothing solution to the growing uncertainty
was to unify Americans under a common banner-
nationalism.

The Know Nothings portrayed the foreign

born and Catholics as threats to the established order of
things, that these groups would somehow wrest control of
politics, religion, and education away from the empowered
natives.

Calling upon Americans to uphold their "race"

and "pride of birth," the Know Nothings began a counter10

Ibid., vi.
Carleton Beals, Brass-Knuckle Crusade, 1800-1860: A Study in the
Origins of American Nativism, (New York: Hastings House, 1960), 5.

11

conspiracy against the "Jesuit conspiracy" which led to
mob violence and riots throughout the 1850s as native
born Americans attempted to maintain their privileged,
superior status over the foreign elements. 13

Distracted

by this call to national arms, Americans embraced this
grassroots movement as an escape from the brewing
sectional strife over the slavery issue that seemed
always on the horizon.
From Beals' narrative, scholars can grasp some
semblance of the American political culture during the
antebellum period as well as the tinge of paranoia and
exclusion that seemed to envelop American society at the
time.

Beals explains that the jingoistic nature of this

movement was like a "nationalistic hypnotism" which
seduced much of the country and helped to foster both
racial and religious intolerance. 14

Although this

increased intolerance kept the national focus away from
the slavery issue for a while, it, too, gave way to the
sectional strife of the period, but remained an
underlying theme for the decades to come.
The political realignment of the 1850s is the focus
of Michael Holt's study, "The Politics of Impatience: The
12

13
14

Ibid., 11-12.
Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 16.
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Origins of Know Nothingism" (1973).

In this work, Holt

discusses the strength of the anti-Catholic movement, its
relationship to the growing popularity of the Know
Nothings, and causes for the disintegration of the Whig
party in the 1850s.

Although Holt acknowledges that the

slavery question was a contributing factor to the
collapse of the two-party system, he believes that other
issues such as the increase in anti-Catholicism,
hostility toward politicians, and an impatience with
politics as usual led many Americans away from the
established parties and into the arms of grassroots
movements such as the Know Nothings. 15
Holt paints a dismal picture of the political
culture of the 1850s.

The corruption and tyranny of

party bosses as well as the perceived unresponsiveness of
government to the needs of the people created public
hostility toward the established parties.

Additionally,

social, economic, and intellectual forces brought on by
the increases in immigration were changing the character
of American culture.

As such, party loyalty became

displaced in the political culture and specific issues
concerning immigration, temperance, and anti-Catholicism

Michael F. Holt, "The Politics of Impatience: The Origins of Know
Nothingisrn," Journal of American History 60 (September 1973), 313.
15
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took prominence.

16

When the major parties continually

failed to produce satisfactory resolutions to these
concerns, impatience set in and the eventual defection to
grassroots movements that would address these problems
occurred.
Holt argues that the increase of immigrants
participating in local and state politics is paramount in
understanding the attraction Americans had to the Know
Nothings in the 1850s.

The immigrant vote in urban

centers was significant in the 1850s.

Often voting in

blocs, immigrants and Catholics could dictate public
policy much to the chagrin of Protestants and middle
class America.

The political party machines recognized

this malleable entity and made efforts to capture their
votes. 17

Of the two major parties, the Democrats were

more successful in garnering the foreign and Catholic
vote and the Whigs, for their part, appealed to
nativists, but did very little to curb the growing
Catholic influence in local government that would
eventually result in movements toward ecclesiastical
ownership of church property, the end of Bible reading in
public schools, and public tax support of parochial
schools.
16

Disenchanted by the willingness of the major

Ibid., 314.
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parties to court foreigners and Catholics and encouraged
by the perceived Catholic threat to American values of
social order, political democracy, public education, and
social mobility, Americans embraced Know Nothing rhetoric
to take action against Catholics and to oust unresponsive
politicians, which, in turn, abetted the slow collapse of
the two-party system. 18
Holt concludes his study by reiterating the appeal
that the Know Nothings had in a time of social and
economic upheaval.

Preying on the public fear of a papal

plot to undermine American democracy, the Know Nothings
were able to convince many Americans that Catholics and
foreigners were to blame for the radical changes
occurring in society.

As such, a rise in the acceptance

of conspiracy theories provided a sense of stability in
an uncertain social, economic, and political environment.
Holt reminds us that this anti-Catholic sentiment never
truly dissipated in the antebellum period.

Even as

national attention was diverted to the growing sectional
crisis in the late-1850s, the effects of anti-Catholicism
still resonated in party politics turning middle and
working class voters against the Democratic party and
toward the Republican party.
17

Ibid., 323.

Anti-Catholicism and its
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papal plot as well as the developing slavocracy
conspiracy (inspired by the Kansas-Nebraska Act,
"bleeding Kansas," and the Lecompton constitution)
enabled the Republicans to solidify their political base
in the North and helped to redefine the American two
party system as the party legitimized its existence with
Abraham Lincoln's election to the presidency in 1860. 19
In his work, The Origins of the Republican Party,
1852-1856 (1987), William Gienapp discusses the impact of
the Know Nothing movement on the Republican party's
formation and its significance in American political
history.

Using contemporary publications, letters, and

records as well as recent interpretive essays and
monographs on the subject, Gienapp offers a compelling
study of the Know Nothing movement which places it in a
unique historical context as a bridge between the Whig
party's demise and the growth of the Republican party,
for being responsible for the disintegration of the
second party system, and for creating the ultimate form
and direction assumed by the third party system.
In dealing with the Know Nothing movement, Gienapp
focuses on the political realignment that took place
during the 1850s and the movement's role within it.
18

Ibid., 324.
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Gienapp contends that the rise of ethnocultural issues
during this time period cut across traditional partisan
lines and was able to disrupt both the Whig and
Democratic coalitions, namely temperance and the anti
Catholic/anti-irnrnigrant movement. 20

Additionally,

although the passage of the Compromise of 1850 seemed to
quell sectional differences, the debate over the Kansas
Nebraska Act in 1854 reshaped party politics as nativism
and antislavery-extension came to dominate northern
concerns.

By skillfully combining nativism, anti-

Nebraskaism, and public opposition to the existing
political parties into their political platform, the Know
Nothings were able to take advantage of the growing
anxiety in the North.

Under attack by temperance and

then nativism, the Whig party collapsed as thousands of
nativist Whigs, as well as a number of Democrats and Free
Soilers, joined the ranks of the Know Nothing movement. 21
Although this explains the collapse of the Whig party,
Gienapp develops his own interpretation as to the
continued rise of the Republicans in the wake of this
political realignment.

19

Ibid., 331.
William Gienapp, The Origins of the Republican Party, 1852-1856,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 444.
21
Ibid.
20
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According to Gienapp, after the demise of the Whigs,
the Know Nothings were the only political threat to the
Democratic party.

Continuing to take a nativist approach

and holding firm to their antislavery-expansion plank,
the Know Nothings were a powerful obstacle for Republican
party aspirations for control over northern anti
Democratic forces.

Gienapp notes that this battle was

not simply a stage between antislavery and nativist
forces.

He contends that the state elections of 1854 and

1855 proved that these issues together constituted a
"stronger party program" than either by themselves. 22

It

would only be in 1856 when the Know Nothings dropped
their anti-Nebraska position in an attempt to gain
further southern support that the Republicans, who were
in the process of courting nativist support, would take
over the reins of leading anti-Democratic sentiment in
the North.

The death peal for the Know Nothings,

however, would come with the impending sectional crisis
which made antislavery-extension, not nativism, the focus
of the anti-Democratic opposition in the North. 23
Gienapp further explains that the historical
significance of the Know Nothing movement really had less

22
23

Ibid., 445.
Ibid.
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to do with their ideas, than with their ability to
mobilize hundreds of thousands of previously
disenfranchised, apathetic, and weakly identified
voters. 24

It was the displacement of the northern voters

to the Republican antislavery cause in 1856 that would
lead to a new two party system and eventually would align
the antislavery sentiments of the North solidly against
the South, leaving Democrats and Know Nothings scrambling
in the wake of the sectional divide.
In his work, Nativism and Slavery (1992), Tyler
Anbinder continues Gienapp's evaluation by making a case
that the Know Nothing party carried forward both a
nativist and antislavery message.

Anbinder's work

focuses primarily on state and local politics since most
of the Know Nothing's influence occurred on these levels
and because that influence differed from region to
region.

Using both contemporary documents and secondary

multidisciplinary interpretative studies, Anbinder's
study delves into three themes--the role of the slavery
controversy in the rise and fall of the Know Nothings,
the depth of anti-Catholic sentiment in the United
States, and the role of nativism in the realignment of
the party system.
24

Ibid., 446.
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Although he agrees with Holt and Gienapp that
disenchantment with both the Whigs and the Democrats
created an ideal opportunity for the Know Nothings to
garner supporters, Anbinder contends that their growing
popularity had more to do with their antislavery
reputation rather than their nativist viewpoint
especially after the enactment of the Kansas-Nebraska
Act.

This is supported by the fact that when the Know

Nothings reversed their antislavery sentiment in 1855,
many northerners flocked to the fledgling Republican
party and its antislavery platform. 25

Therefore, Anbinder

breaks from Gienapp, Holt, and others, as he argues that
slavery, not nativism, destroyed the second party system.
Anbinder also broaches the argument over what impact
the Republican party's adoption of nativism had in
attracting voters away from the Know Nothings after 1855.
He points out that although the Republicans did preach a
nativist stand, few concessions, if any, were made to
those Know Nothings who left the American party.

By

1856, even the Know Nothings, themselves, were concerned
less with nativist propaganda than they were with the
idea of being a national party with the goal of
25

Tyler G. Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know
Nothings and the Politics of the 1850s, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992), 278.

preserving the Union.

The Republicans, for their part,

simply moderated their radical stand on slavery extension
and supported issues such as temperance and tariffs to
wean enough northern votes to affect the electoral
balance in 1856 and once again in 1860. 2 6
Perhaps one of the most poignant questions asked by
Anbinder in his study concerns the strength of nativist
sentiment in American society during the 1850s.

During

this time, Anbinder notes, American bigotry toward the
Irish and Catholics was extraordinarily high, so why did
permanent nativist organizations fail to establish
themselves as political forces, such as the Know
Nothings? 27

Although historian Eric Foner has made a

distinction between "cultural" nativism, which has
constant appeal, and "political" nativisrn, which is
conditional in his Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men
(1970), historians tend to see this as too artificial.
Anbinder postulates that although many Americans held
nativist views, few made them a priority in the voting
booth.

Anbinder reminds us that nativism competed with

sectional, economic, and local issues.

Its appeal in the

1850s had much to do with the circumstances of the time-
unprecedented levels of immigration, religious disputes
26

Ibid., 273.
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over education and church property--as well as its
association with other movements--anti-slavery,
temperance, and political reform.28
The theme of nativism is the focus of Dale Knobel's
1996 study, "America for Americans".

In this work,

Knobel traces nativist movements throughout American
history.

Using both contemporary and secondary source

materials and interpretations, he presents a very
compelling argument for the appeal of the Know Nothings
during the antebellum period as well as explaining the
American attraction to nativist thinking.
Like Foner, Knobel distinguishes between political
nativism and cultural nativism in his analysis of the
brevity of the Know Nothing movement.

Knobel, for his

part, also contends that there is no simple explanation
for this brevity and actually takes offense to many
historical interpretations that treat the rise and fall
of the Know Nothings as something symmetrical--"what
brought the party up must also be what brought it down"-
or as a proverbial "flash in the pan." 29

These

explanations do not explain the mass appeal of the party
or the fact that nativism played as much of a part in
27
28

Ibid., 277.
Ibid.

39

American politics after the fall of the Know Nothings as
before their rise.

Although the movement was full of

political opportunists, had competing interests, and many
nativist leaders and followers eventually found new
political homes in the Republican party, Knobel argues
that one cannot ignore the presence of a central message
that attracted hundreds of thousands of followers to the
movement and whose politicization by the Know Nothings in
the 1850s helped to realign political ideologies for
decades to come. 30
To further this argument, Knobel explains that the
appeal of nativism and its ideology were interwoven in
the issue of individual autonomy.

In a time where

American republicanism took on new meaning in the face of
industrialization, urbanization, and geographical
expansion, Americans needed to feel secure in their
autonomy, their liberty.

In the face of a changing

society, many Americans were concerned about possible
threats to this autonomy, to the development of their
natural talents and their inner potential. 31

Simply put,

"to lose one's autonomy was to become a 'slave'u--which,
in accordance to the times, left many Americans
29

Dale T. Knobel, "America for Americans": The Nativist Movement in
the United States, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), 98-99.
30
Ibid., 99.
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extraordinarily fearful and highly impressionable to
appeals to protect this individual liberty. 32

Mirroring

the Hofstadter interpretation, this encouraged the use of
paranoia tactics, such as conspiracy theories, to
convince the American public that "outsiders" were
somehow corrupting American republicanism or were to
blame for their own station in society instead of
universal political, economic, or social forces.
Knobel concludes that American political nativism
never really died.

Even after the defeat of the American

party in 1856, the social movement and its organization
never completely disappeared.

They remained waiting

until the opportunity to rise again was ripe--the
American Protective Association, the Ku Klux Klan of the
1920s, and McCarthyism.

Knobel argues that the Know

Nothing movement with its nativist attraction was
anything but a flash in the pan.

He contends that, what

contributed to its rise and fall was not nativism at all,
but the movement's necessity for ideological purity and
selective membership as seen in its fraternal and
Ibid., 99-100.
Ibid., 99. For further discussion concerning notions of autonomy,
especially ownership of one's work, of one's labor in working class
America during the antebellum period, see David R. Roediger, The
Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class
(New York: Verso, 1991); and Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New
York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1778-1850 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1984).
31

32
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beneficiary societies and reform organizations. 33

The

ideology was essential for these smaller groups, but on
the national stage, plagued with sectional strife, it
could not transform into a mass political party.
As can be ascertained from this brief
historiographical essay, the Know Nothing movement was
much more complicated and influential than once believed.
Rather than being a third party nuisance or antebellum
fad, the movement had roots deep within the fabric of
American consciousness.

Although nativism and anti

Catholicism were its underlying foci and made the
movement highly popular, its embrace of national issues
such as antislavery and temperance would eventually lead
to the collapse of the established second party system
and help to create a new political alignment.

The

party's own undoing was a result less of its nativist and
anti-Catholic ideology, which would live well beyond Know
Nothingism's life span, but of its desire to unify the
country in a time of sectional strife by moderating and
reversing its stand on the slavery issue.

The naive

belief that nativism and anti-Catholicism were somehow
stronger than the slavery issue signaled the movement's
eventual downfall.
33

Ibid., 153.
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Summary
In the study of the Know Nothings, historians and
political scholars still have some work ahead of them.
Modern monographs and interpretations on the Know
Nothings are extraordinarily disjointed considering the
movement's impact on the antebellum period.

Additional

work needs to be done on the southern Know Nothing
movement as well as nativist and Know Nothing influence
in the midwest and far west during this era.

Also,

historians can begin to use interdisciplinary methods and
theories to advance their understanding and
interpretations of this movement's significance.

These

would be excellent supplements to the paranoia hypothesis
advocated by Hofstadter.

It will be the

interdisciplinary methods and theories surrounding
frustration-aggression, conflict, and aggression
displacement that will be reviewed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF PREJUDICE
Frustration-Aggression Theory
In 1939, the Institute of Human Relations at Yale
University sought to create a hypothesis to explain
aggressive acts in terms of prior frustrations that
people had endured.

It was hoped that this hypothesis

would offer an analysis of child training, adolescence,
criminology, democracy, fascism, communism as well as
race prejudice.

Simply entitled, Frustration and

Aggression, John Dollard, Leonard Doob, Neal Miller,
0. H. Mowrer, and Robert R. Sears undertook the daunting
task of formulating a comprehensive hypothesis and theory
to explain the problems of human relations.
The hypothesis began with the simple premise that
aggression was always a consequence of frustration.

A

very noble effort to disguise common sense with science,
but this premise did add something of value to the
problem of predicting human behavior when other
psychological factors were taken into consideration.

In

an attempt to gain a better understanding of the specific
forms that aggression took, Dollard, et al provided a
44

more systematic analysis of four groups of factors: the
amount of frustration, the effects of punishment, the
displacement of aggression, and the catharsis of
.

aggression. 1
In analyzing these four factors, Dollard, et al
offered several hypotheses.

Three of which are relevant

to the study of American race relations.

First, they

concluded that when the strength of frustration was held
constant, there would be a greater anticipation of
punishment for an aggressive act and, therefore,
aggression was less likely to occur.

Second, when the

anticipation of punishment was held constant, the
strength of the frustration would be greater and an
aggressive act was more likely to occur. 2

Third, and

most important, when acts of direct aggression were
inhibited, this provided additional frustration against
the object perceived to be responsible for this
inhibition and increased the possibility of other forms
of aggression.

It was, therefore, possible for this

inhibited aggression to be displaced to different objects
and expressed in modified forms. 3
Targets of this displaced aggression often included
villains who were represented on television or in motion
1

John Dollard, et al, Frustration and Aggression,
University Press, 1939), 27.
2
Ibid., 38.
3
Ibid., 53.

(New Haven: Yale
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pictures as well as minority groups such as Jews,
foreigners, and African Americans.

According to Dollard,

et al, these "outgroupers" were blamed for the
frustrations that were actually part of human existence.
They were made into scapegoats and were socially defined
by the "ingroup" by differences in custom or physical
characteristics.

They were thought of as "perennial

frustrators, as traditional enemies and threats to the
integrity of in-group life." 4

Such a representation was

required to justify the displacement of aggression to
them.
Whereas Frustration and Aggression proposed myriad
hypotheses, the work fell short of offering any
conclusive empirical data to support the analyses of its
authors.

What the study was able to accomplish, however,

was the creation of a stepping stone for further research
and evaluation in the various subject matters it
concerned itself with.

One such research project focused

on the idea of displaced frustration and its impact on
race and ethnic relations.

Although the final report

would provide empirical support for the hypothesis
forwarded in Frustration and Aggression, it would be
subjected to strict scrutiny by contemporary peers and be

4

Ibid., 90.
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considered suspect by late-twentieth-century social
scientists.
Hovland's and Sears' Conflict Theory
In 1933, Arthur F. Raper presented a graph with two
statistics, the number of lynchings in the nine cotton
producing states and the per-acre value of cotton, in his
book, The Tragedy of Lynching.

Looking at the years

1901-1930 (omitting 1918-1920 because of the influences
of the First World War on both cotton production and the
number of lynchings and racial violence), Raper's work
showed an accelerating decrease in lynchings and a slow
increase of cotton prices per acre for the period.

Using

these observations, Raper suggested that "periods of
relative prosperity bring reduction in lynching and
periods of depression cause an increase." 5

This thought,

seemingly insignificant to Raper's study, became the
basis for the construction of one of the most popular
illustrations of frustration-aggression theory--Hovland's
and Sears' Correlation of Lynchings with Economic
Indices.
Published in 1940 under the title, "Minor Studies of
Aggression," psychologists Carl I. Hovland and Robert R.
Sears provided empirical evidence that linked social
5

Arthur F. Raper, The Tragedy of Lynching,
of North Carolina Press, 1933), 30.

(Chapel Hill: University

aggression to phases in the economic cycle.

Their

hypothesis stated that acts of aggression would be more
numerous during times of economic depression than in
times of economic prosperity.

To prove this hypothesis,

Hovland and Sears used statistics on the number of
lynchings per year and correlated them with indices of
economic conditions between 1882 and 1930.

Since the

vast majority of lynching cases occurred in the South,
and since cotton was the basic commodity of that region,
the value of cotton was used as the index of greatest
value in connection with lynchings.
Hovland and Sears computed linear trends for the
number of lynchings reported during this time period as
well as the number of those lynched who happened to be
black.

Similar trends were computed for the total value

of cotton produced in the fourteen Southern states and
for the per-acre value of cotton.

Deviations for the two

sets were determined from the trend lines.

Lastly, the

average Ayers index was calculated for each year from the
monthly composite indices and several tetrachoric
correlations were obtained. 6

6

Carl Iver Hovland and Robert R. Sears, �Minor Studies of
Aggression: VI. Correlation of Lynchings with Economic Indices,"
Journal of Psychology 9 (1940), 302-306. The Ayres index was
developed by Leonard P. Ayres and includes weighted individual
measures of consumption, production, construction, imports, exports,
and prices.
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The correlation between total lynchings and the
Ayers index of economic activity was -.65.

Slightly

higher correlations were obtained when the comparison was
made between the number of blacks who were lynched and
per-acre value of cotton (-.63) and the farm value of
cotton (-.72). 7

From these figures, Hovland and Sears

inferred that a correlation did exist between economic
conditions and the amount of social aggression and
proceeded to embark upon the meaning of such a
relationship.
Of particular interest to Hovland and Sears was the
fact that there did not exist any causal relationship
between the source of frustration (economic downturns in
the cotton market) and the objects toward which the
aggression was expressed (African Americans).

It was

painstakingly clear that African Americans could not be
responsible for the value of cotton or the general level
of business activity; so why were they singled out as
objects of aggression?
Hovland and Sears explained that although it is
common to direct acts of aggression against the agent
perceived as the frustrator, "such acts can occur only if
the agent is available and if the act will not elicit too
much counter-aggression or punishment." 8
Ibid., 306.
Ibid., 302.

Since it was
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impossible to direct aggression against a condition
represented by index numbers, it was necessary to find
another object to focus the aggression.

Hovland and

Sears argued that although merchants, landlords, and
wealthy persons could represent the condition
symbolically, the retribution or punishment of directing
aggression toward these persons of preferred or protected
status in society would be relatively high.

Following

the principle outlined in Frustration and Aggression,
which stated that the anticipation of being punished
inhibits the act of direct aggression and permits the
occurrence of displaced aggression, they deduced that the
aggression would be directed toward persons of "a less
favorable and protected position" and were unable to
adequately render retribution. 9
In the case of lynching victims, Hovland and Sears
were quick to point out that the majority of those
lynched had actually been arrested for a crime.

There

already existed a degree of frustration against these
persons for violating the public norms.

In other words,

they were already the targets of a certain degree of
direct aggression.

Hovland and Sears reconciled this

problem by inferring that these persons would suffer more
serious aggressions from the group when subsidiary
9

Ibid., 308.
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frustrations, in this case, low economic indices, were
present.

The increase in the number of those persons

lynched verified their expectation and allowed Hovland
and Sears to conclude that
Individuals who arouse direct aggression suffer the
additional effects of displaced aggression when the
agent responsible for this latter is either not
available or would retaliate with a great amount of
punishment or counter-aggression. 10
Although Hovland's and Sears' findings gained
immediate acceptance in the academic community and would
serve as empirical support for the frustration-aggression
thesis formulated by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and
Sears, this acceptance was short-lived and the hypothesis
would come under a series of attacks beginning in 1946
with Alexander Mintz's, "A Re-examination of Correlations
between Lynchings and Economic Indices," and continued to
be a topic of contention by social scientists well into
the 1990s.
Mintz's Re-Examination of Correlations between Lynchings
and Economic Indices
Alexander Mintz published the first critique of
Hovland's and Sears' hypothesis in his 1946 article, "A
Re-examination of Correlations between Lynchings and
Economic Indices."
10

Ibid.

Mintz's primary concern was that the
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method Hovland and Sears used in gaining their
correlations was flawed.

Mintz first noted that because

both cotton value and the frequency of lynching were
correlated with time in Hovland's and Sears' study, the
presence of a correlation between them would be
"unsuitable" as evidence about any causal relationship
between them since "all variables exhibiting marked time

trends tend to be intercorrelated." 11

Second, by

computing linear trends and using the deviations of their
variables from the trends in their correlations, Mintz
believed that Hovland and Sears created a fundamental
error where the trends exhibited by the data were not
linear and some of their correlations appeared to be
artifacts caused by the arbitrary choice of straight

lines which were not appropriate to the data. 12

Additionally, Mintz found the tetrachoric approximations
to the product-moment correlations used by Hovland and
Sears to be misleading.

By using this correlation,

Hovland and Sears assumed the normal distribution and
homoscedasticity of the variables.

Mintz argued that

they were neither. 13
In reconstructing Hovland's and Sears' study, Mintz
found large discrepancies between their findings and his.
11

Alexander Mintz, •A Re-Examination of Correlations between
Lynchings and Economic Indices,ll Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology 41 (1946), 154.
12
Ibid., 154-155
13
Ibid., 155.
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Using product-moment correlations instead of tetrachoric
and by utilizing subdivisions of time intervals for the
computation of linear trends for parts of the period
rather than the whole period, Mintz confirmed his belief
that the trends exhibited by the number of black
lynchings and by the total value of cotton were not
linear.

Mintz also discovered that the product-moment

correlation between the farm value of cotton and the
number of black lynchings for 1882-1913 was -.25, a
substantial difference from Hovland's and Sears' -.72 for
the who.le period, 1882-1930.

Additionally, when Mintz

applied the product-moment method to deviations in the
total number of lynchings and the Ayers index for the
entire period, his correlation was a meager -.34 compared
to the tetrachoric correlation of -.65. 14
By both re-examining and reconstructing Hovland's
and Sears' study, Mintz raised the question as to whether
or not a correlation existed between lynchings and
economic indices.

His figures showed that no such

correlation existed between the farm value of cotton and
black lynchings and that the correlation between the
Ayres index and total lynchings was much weaker than
first discovered.

Mintz's basic conclusions led to the

prospect that the Hovland and Sears study should not be
14

Ibid., 160.
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used to validate the frustration-aggression hypothesis
nor could it be used as proof for the idea of displaced
aggression.
Concern over the social science community's
continued acceptance of Hovland's and Sears' study in the
face of Mintz's critique was expressed by John Shelton
Reed, Gail E. Doss, and Jeanne S. Hurlbert in their 1987
essay, "Too Good to be False: An Essay in the Folklore of
Social Science."

Their criticism of this acceptance led

to the reanalysis of Hovland's and Sears' findings using
contemporary time-series techniques.
Hepworth and West: A Time-Series Reanalysis of Hovland
and Sears
Joseph T. Hepworth and Stephen G. West undertook the
task of reanalyzing the Hovland and Sears study using
contemporary time-series techniques in their 1988 essay,
"Lynchings and the Economy: A Time-Series Reanalysis of
Hovland and Sears (1940) ."

Their rationale for

reanalyzing Hovland and Sears stemmed not only from
contemporary criticism of the original study, but because
of the belief that recent developments in time-series
analysis permitted better statistical analyses of the
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temporal data than the techniques available to Hovland
and Sears in 1940. 15
Hepworth and West first replicated the original
Hovland and Sears study.

They did this in order to

establish that the correct data was used and that the
analytic techniques were applied in the same manner.
Hepworth �nd West explained that if the original results
were not replicated, "then any discrepant results found
using a different analytic technique could be attributed
not only to the different technique but also to the lack

of original replication." 16

When Hepworth and West attempted to reproduce the
three original values, only two of them were consistent
with Hovland and Sears.

A discrepancy was found in the

correlation between the per-acre value of cotton and
black lynchings.

Whereas Hovland and Sears reported a

-.63 correlation, Hepworth and West only obtained a
-.50. 17

Hepworth and West rationalized that the two most

plausible explanations for the discrepancy were either a
misprint in the acre value of cotton reported by Hovland
and Sears or Hovland and Sears made an error in
calculating the tetrachoric correlation for this value. 18
15 Joseph T. Hepworth and Stephen G. West, "Lynchings and the
Economy: A Time-Series Reanalysis of Hovland and Sears (1940),"
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 55 (1988), 239.
16
Ibid., 242.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
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Hepworth and West then used product-moment
correlations as well as the synchronous cross
correlations produced in the time-series analysis for
comparison values against those produced by Hovland and
Sears for black and total lynchings (See Table 2).

The

results seemed to confirm Mintz's conclusion that Hovland
and Sears seriously overestimated the relationship that
existed between economic indices and lynchings.
Table 2
Correlations Between Lynchings and Economic Indices
Ayres Index
with Total
Lynchings

Acre Value
with Black
Lynchings

Farm Value
with Black
Lynchings

Hovland and Sears
(Tetrachoric)

-.65

-.63

-.72

Product-Momemt

-.34

-.14

-.21

Time-Series

-.42

-.20

-.23

Correlation

Hepworth and West, however, took their analysis of
the Hovland and Sears study a step further and calculated
correlations between white lynchings and economic
indices.

Contrary to the prediction of the frustration

aggression hypothesis, positive correlations were
discovered between white lynchings and the acre value of
cotton and the farm value of cotton using the methods of

Hovland and Sears.

These correlations, however, became

negative and approached levels of statistical
significance when time-series models were developed (-.26
and -.25, respectively) . 19
Although the time-series method failed to support
the findings of Hovland and Sears, Hepworth's and West's
ability to replicate the majority of the original study
did verify the basic conclusions drawn in the original
work--that frustration can lead to forms of aggression.
Additionally, through the new findings that correlated
white lynchings with economic conditions, they were able
to provide better support for Hovland's and Sears'
initial premise that under difficult economic or other
stressful conditions, aggression can be displaced to
group members who are less than likely to have the
ability to retaliate.
Miller's Theory of Aggression Displacement
In 1948, Neal Miller expanded upon the frustration
aggression hypothesis in his essay, "Theory and
Experiment to Stimulus-Response Generalization."

In this

work, Miller sought to prove that racial persecution was
produced by displacement rather than by an instinct of
aggression.
19

In his hypothesis, outgroupers could not

Ibid., 245-246.
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only be the targets of the direct aggression aroused
through competition with ingroupers, but could also be
scapegoats for suppressed aggression caused internally
among ingroupers and displaced to members of the
outgroup. 20

This notion of displacement was originally

examined by Sigmund Freud in his work on transference
where he believed that patients would displace feelings
of love or hate to their analyst rather than to the true
object or origin of those feelings. 21
Whereas the work of Hovland and Sears and Hepworth
and West dealt with statistical data obtained through
historical records, Miller's study on aggression used
live subjects--albino rats.

In Miller's study, rats were

trained to attack one another when a mild shock was
administered.

After this training, a small doll was

introduced into the arena with two rats and the shock was
administered again.
another.

Once again, the rats attacked one

The significance of this was that the rats did

not attack the doll.

When a second rat was not present,

however, attacks on the doll commenced.

This led Miller

to hypothesize that when another rat and the doll were
both present, the stronger tendency was to attack the
other rat, the object of direct aggression.
20

When the

Neal E. Miller, "Theory and Experiment Relating Psychoanalytic
Displacement to Stimulus-Response Generalization," Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology 43 (1948), 155.
21
Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (New York:
Boni & Livewright, 1920), 384-386.
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second rat was not present, aggression would be displaced
to the doll. 22
In another experiment conducted by Miller and Bergen
Richard Bugelski, "Minor Studies in Aggression: The
Influence of Frustrations Imposed by the In-Group on
Attitudes Expressed Toward Out-Groups"

(1948), human

subjects were analyzed in a similar way.

In this

experiment, subjects were angered by frustrations weighed
upon them by their own countrymen.

The subjects

responded by expressing less than favorable attitudes
toward foreigners who could not have been responsible for
their frustration rather than taking out their
frustration on members of their own ingroup.
Fitz's Re-Examination of Miller's Conflict Theory of
Aggression Displacement
Don Fitz re-examined Miller's original hypothesis of
displaced aggression using human subjects in 1976.

In

his study, "A Renewed Look at Miller's Conflict Theory of
Aggression Displacement," Fitz attempted to adequately
test the conflict theory of aggression displacement by
demonstrating that less aggression would occur to targets
with decreasing similarity to the original source of
frustration and that increased inhibition toward the

22

Miller, 158.
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original source of frustration should illicit the
strongest aggression to occur to a displaced target. 23
In this experiment, subjects were divided into three
groups where their level of arousal was manipulated
through interaction with a confederate.

In the first

group, the controlled group, subjects were given no
reason to be annoyed or fearful of the confederate's
behavior.

In the second group, subjects were annoyed by

the confederate, but given no reason to fear him and in
the last group subjects were both annoyed and fearful of
the confederate.

It was believed that the most intense

aggression should come from members of the second group
and the least intense from those in the controlled group,
that subjects in the second group would be most
aggressive to their annoyer and least aggressive toward
targets with the least similarity to their annoyer, and
that subjects of the third group should be least
aggressive toward their annoyer and most aggressive
toward targets with the least similarity to their
annoyer. 24
Fitz's experiment confirmed the first two beliefs,
but the third belief, that subjects of the third group
should be least aggressive toward their annoyer and most
23

Don Fitz, "A Renewed Look at Miller's Conflict Theory of
Aggression Displacement," Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 33 (1976), 727.
24
Ibid., 729.
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aggressive toward targets with the least similarity to
their annoyer was not totally confirmed since subjects of
this third group seemed to displace their aggression to
targets of both similarity and dissimilarity to their
frustrator.

Another result of Fitz's study was that

those members of the control group were significantly
more aggressive toward the most displaced target than was
previously expected. 25

Fitz's re-examination,

nevertheless, strongly supported Miller's original
conflict theory and provided sufficient proof for
theories of displaced aggression.
Summary
This chapter has looked at the development of the
frustration-aggression theory as well as some of its
adherents.

It should be noted that although the

frustration-aggression hypothesis has its detractors, it
has led to a sub-field of study on the causes of
frustration and is still one of the classic examples used
by social psychologists and sociologists to describe the
social phenomenon of scapegoat theory. 26

Having outlined

the premises of conflict analysis and aggression
displacement in this chapter, we can now apply these
25

Ibid., 730-731.
For examples of its current use see The Handbook of Social
Psychology (1985) by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson; Social
Psychology: A Critical Agenda (1995) by Rex Stainton Rogers, et al;
and Tamotsu Shibutani's Society and Personality (1987).
26
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hypotheses to Hofstadter's paranoid interpretation in an
effort to better understand the prevailing anti
Catholic/anti-foreign sentiment of the antebellum period.
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CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
In using frustration-aggression-analysis to defend
the Hofstadter paranoia interpretation of history, a few
cursory observations must be made.

Unlike the

quantitative data available to Hovland and Sears in their
study on lynchings, the quantitative data that exists
concerning individual acts of violence directed toward
immigrants and Catholics nationwide during the antebellum
period is extraordinarily disjointed. 1

As such,

utilizing scientific approaches (i. e. product-moment or
time-series analysis) to quantitatively support the
Hofstadter interpretation on the broad scale established
in this paper can not be readily accomplished.
Additionally, although the abandonment of the major
political parties at this time can provide quantitative
data, these numbers would be unreliable since records as
1

In his 1998 work, American Mobbing, 1828-1861, David Grimsted
discussed the violence against Catholics and immigrants during the
antebellum period. Although no specific numbers of individual acts
of violence are recorded (as opposed to the data on lynchings used by
Hovland and Sears), Grimsted does point out that the Know Nothings
were involved in at least twenty-two political riots during the
height of their popularity (1854-56). Of these, three occurred in
the North, and the rest in the urban centers of the slave South,
accounting for seventy-seven deaths and a ftparallel portion" of
injuries. See pages 218-245. Examples of individual acts of
violence against Catholics and immigrants can be found in most
monographs concerning the Know Nothing movement. See Anbinder,
Beals, Bennett, Billington, Curran, Knobel, and Overdyke.
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to why individuals left certain political parties and
joined others do not exist.

What we do have in the 1850s

is a growing trend of Americans, mostly Anglo-Saxon
Protestants, finding refuge in third-party organizations.
In the North, these organizations were nativist and/or
anti-slavery.

In the South, they were nativist and/or

anti-secessionist.

The appeal, according to several

historians, was an impatience or distrust of the current
political system to confront the major problems
concerning Americans--slavery and sectionalism,
industrialization, urbanization, and immigration.
Frustration ensued and, coupled with Hofstadter's
paranoia hypothesis, led to aggression against those
thought responsible--immigrants and Catholics.

The

frustration-aggression analysis, therefore, will be used
to support that supposition.
Applying the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis
As explained by Hovland and Sears, it is common to
direct acts of aggression against the agent perceived as
the frustrator, but "such acts can occur only if the
agent is available and if the act will not elicit too
much counter-aggression or punishment." 2

During the

antebellum period, it was impossible for the public to
2

Carl Iver Hovland and Robert R. Sears, "Minor Studies of
Aggression: VI. Correlation of Lynchings with Economic Indices,"
Journal of Psychology 9 (1940), 302.
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direct aggression against economic and social conditions.
It was necessary, then, to find another object to focus
that aggression.

Although employers, merchants,

landlords, politicians, and the wealthy could represent
the conditions symbolically, the retribution or
punishment of directing aggression toward these persons
of preferred or protected status in society was
relatively high.
Following the principle outlined in Frustration and
Aggression, which stated that the anticipation of being
punished inhibits the act of direct aggression and
permits the occurrence of displaced aggression, it
follows that the aggression would be directed toward
persons of "a less favorable and protected position" and
were unable to adequately render retribution. 3

In the

antebellum period, these "outgroupers" were immigrants
and Catholics whose language and cultural barriers set
them apart from the rest of American society. 4
According to Dollard, et al, these "outgroupers"
could easily be blamed for the frustrations that were
actually part of human existence.

They were made into

scapegoats and were socially defined by the "ingroup" by
differences in custom or physical characteristics.
3

They

Ibid., 308.
Although separate from this study, it should also be noted that
blacks and abolitionists were also targets of aggression during this
time period.
4
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were thought of as "perennial frustrators, as traditional
enemies and threats to the integrity of in-group life." 5
Such a representation was required to justify the
displacement of aggression to them.

In the case of

Catholics, this degree of frustration had existed in
Protestant Europe and later America, since the 1500s,
propagated by the paranoid belief of a papal conspiracy.
Since Catholics were already targets of a certain degree
of aggression, nativists used this paranoia as a tool to
displace even further aggression toward this group in
times of economic, political, and social uncertainty.
The increased acceptance of anti-Catholic sentiment and
the continued growth and strength of grassroots
organizations such as the Know Nothings, supports that
analysis.
Additionally, when it appeared that even the
political system seemed to defend and empower these
"outgroups" by courting immigrant votes and incorporating
the Catholic agenda into public policy, frustration
toward the Whigs and Democrats occurred resulting in the
aggressive action of abandonment in favor of
organizations more responsive to the growing need to
displace aggression toward immigrants and Catholics-
nativists.
5

Therefore, the collapse of the two-party

John Dollard, et al., Frustration and Aggression, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1939), 90.
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system in the 1850s and the rise of the Know Nothing
party can be partially attributed to the public need to
displace aggression, and the unwillingness of the
political parties of that time to adequately respond to
that need.
Conclusion
During the 1840s and 1850s, many Americans had
become frustrated with the economic, political, and
social upheaval brought about by industrialization,
urbanization, and immigration.

The culture of the United

States was evolving and this transformation threatened to
leave many Americans trembling in its wake.

Fearful of

the future, the populace looked to its elected leaders
for assistance.

Finding the political parties to be

unresponsive, Americans resorted to other organizations
to meet these perceived threats to American society,
organizations that would tell them what they wanted to
hear, organizations that would direct responsibility for
the country's problems away from the American economic
and political systems and toward some outside threat.

At

fault was not America--it had not abandoned the agrarian
principles of the Founding Fathers--but infiltrators
attempting to destroy the country from the inside out.

This was the premise that gave rise to the nativist
movement of antebellum America.

The paranoia

interpretation espoused by Hofstadter is one explanation
for the American embrace of nativist propaganda.

This

acceptance allowed opportunistic organizations like the
Know Nothings to divert public attention from the
problems of modernization and toward some outside threat.
Preying on American paranoia, the Know Nothings were able
to mold public frustrations concerning the economy,
politics, and social concerns into a movement that
redirected that frustration into aggression toward
immigrants and Catholics.

The acts of violence, the

willingness to abridge the rights of new immigrants, and
the abandonment of the major political parties as well as
the ability of the Know Nothings to create a national
discourse based on this frustration-aggression against
immigrants and Catholics is testament to the success of
that redirection.
The Know Nothing movement was not the first, nor was
it the last, to employ paranoia as a tool in creating
frustration within the American citizenry.

Other

organizations followed the nativist example and some even
improved upon it.

In the 1880s and 1890s, the American

Protective League was the agent redirecting the public
frustration concerning labor strife, depressed
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agricultural conditions, and political corruption toward
aggressive acts against the waves of new immigrants
entering the country by convincing many, native-born
Americans that their foreign cultures and vast numbers
would pollute the already volatile American social and
economic structure.

Similarly, labor unrest after the

First World War gave rise to the Red Scare and the Ku
Klux Klan.

With this rise came increased aggression

toward communists, socialists, unions, immigrants and
minorities, all of whom supposedly wished to destroy the
American institutions of democracy and capitalism.
McCarthyism, which gained credence in the wake of the
Cold War that followed the Second World War, perfected
the use of paranoia against those individuals that the
House Un-American Activities Committee considered a
threat to American society and culture--basically anyone
who did not conform to what the Committee deemed to be
American.

The communist witch hunt and the growing

suspicion that ensued curtailed American civil liberties
and made every American a suspect of contributing to the
communist conspiracy.

Even today, in 2003, we can see

how the agents of paranoia are using fear to redirect
frustration into propaganda and aggression against
"outsidersn that have little to nothing to do with
current economic and political crises.
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Knowledge and use of the Hofstadter interpretation
in conjunction with frustration-aggression analysis can
be an effective research tool for understanding and
explaining past and present attempts to exclude
individuals from participating in American democracy.

As

can be seen in this brief study, interdisciplinary
approaches can provide additional insights to historical,
social, and political problems.

Although the

frustration-aggression analysis was utilized here, other
sociological theories concerning power-threat analysis
(Herbert Blalock and Seymour Spilerman) or competition
(Susan Olzak) could have easily been used in conjunction
with Hofstadter's paranoia interpretation and should
serve as quantitative methods in future interdisciplinary
projects.

Additionally, in-depth studies of the Know

Nothing movement based upon the frustration-aggression
model could be undertaken by reviewing local and county
records and using the rudimentary quantitative data
available concerning immigration, violence, and voting
trends to give further support to the general premise
outlined in this thesis.
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